

Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska*
Piotr Leśniewski*

Styles of Education: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Paulo Freire

Abstract

This paper provides an analogical analysis of the educational styles of Paulo Freire and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Although it seems they do not have much in common, we have found some striking similarities regarding, above all, their attitude towards the foundation of education and the deep, abstract structure of human/social relations. Consequently, in this paper, we posit that accurately (pragmatically) organized education in logic is necessary for any dialogical approach to education and social life.

Keywords

Education, Logic, Dialogue, Paulo Freire, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz

*Stultification is not an inveterate superstition;
it is fear in the face of liberty. Routine is not ignorance;
it is the cowardice and pride of people who renounce
their own power for the unique pleasure of
affirming their neighbor's incapacity.*

Jacques Rancière (1991)

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Paulo Freire were two exquisite 20th-century thinkers from very different backgrounds who nevertheless share many similarities in their ideas on education. Freire was one of Brazil's most renowned representatives of the Pedagogy of Liberation, while Ajdukiewicz was a distinguished philosopher from the Lviv-Warsaw School. The former

* Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
Email: kgank@wp.pl and grus@amu.edu.pl

was connected with the dialogical Latin-American tradition, and the latter was an analytical philosopher *par excellence*. However, both can be considered classic representatives of horizontal structures within education and culture in general, as thinkers who saw that education is the only possible way of bringing about positive, lasting change in society. While Freire emphasized the role of dialogue, Ajdukiewicz assigned logic a central role in education. However, in the deeper structure, their approaches are fundamentally dialogical—i.e., concerned with anti-irrational/biophilic organization, and this is what we want to posit in this paper.

The essential characteristics of the Lviv-Warsaw School are firstly an attitude characterized by intellectual honesty, clarity of language, and philosophical analysis, and secondly, a sense of mission and the importance of philosophical endeavours. The founder of this outstanding Polish philosophy school, namely Kazimierz Twardowski, never forced his disciples to follow his interests, ideas, or conceptions; he encouraged every one of them to develop their talents, skills, and opportunities. This attitude explains why the members of the Lviv-Warsaw School include logicians, methodologists, historians of philosophy, ethicists, and phenomenologists, as well as people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs, genders, and specialities.

One may say that Ajdukiewicz was a “freedom fighter” on every possible occasion—he was on the frontlines of three major conflicts, took part in the underground teachings during World War Two, and was dubbed “Casimir the Magnificent” (Polish: *Kazimierz Wspaniały*) during his presidency at the Poznań University. Let us also emphasize that Ajdukiewicz created a Logical Empire in Poland’s harsh post-war Stalinist era.¹

Paulo Freire represented the Liberation movement in Latin America and faced enormous challenges from childhood: he experienced malnourishment, hunger, and poverty; and later in life, he also suffered political persecution. It is worth mentioning that already, as a child, he promised to sacrifice his life to improve the lives of poor children and dreamt about a future where no child would experience famine. They both overcame all their life

¹ From 1945 to 1953, Ajdukiewicz held the position of professor at the University of Poznań, first as Head of the Department of Logic and Methodology of Science, and finally, as a Rector of the University (1948-1952). By *Logical Empire* we mean a large group of prominent scientists created by Ajdukiewicz during this difficult postwar period. It comprised of over a 100 researchers working creatively in all areas of logic, broadly understood, including formal logic, logical semiotics, and the methodology of science, including: Roman Suszko, Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa, Henryk Mehlberg, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, Stefan Swieżawski, and Ludwik Borkowski.

challenges with great success and left us with legacies still relevant today. They have inspired many generations of thinkers and projects to be implemented and developed in various contexts, especially education.

In the paper, we focus on an analogical analysis of the educational styles of Ajdukiewicz and Freire, based on their canonic works, like the former's "Pragmatic Logic," his textbooks, and articles on the topic, and the latter's two books "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" and "Por uma pedagogia de la pergunta." We present the essential elements of both conceptions to show that Ajdukiewicz's fight against irrationalism bore many similarities with Freire's fight against the 'banking' concept of education.

1. Pragmatics: Generative Themes Adapted to Circumstances

One of the main topics of Paulo Freire's pedagogy is the notion of "generative themes." The basic idea is to get students involved with real-life problems, things that concern them, things they encounter in everyday life: at school or work, or in their professional, political, social, and private lives.

He wrote: "The starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the people's aspirations. Utilizing certain basic contradictions, we must pose this existential, concrete, present situation to the people as a problem which challenges them and requires a response—not just at the intellectual level, but at the level of action" (Freire 1996, 76-77).

The same idea was behind Ajdukiewicz's project and the posthumously published book *Pragmatic Logic*. This excellent work, edited by H. Mortimer and K. Szaniawski, provides an example of his always innovative, profound, and independent thinking and is simply a highly original logic textbook. It consists of 460 pages and, interestingly, only 43 of these are devoted to the deductive sciences, while nine pages cover formal logic and consequence relations.² Ajdukiewicz is a precursor of the contemporary revolution in logic, namely, the so-called *practical turn*.

² "The main core of elementary logic. i.e., logic in the narrower sense of the term as the discipline which lists and systematizes all the schemata of deductive inference (and the underlying logical tautologies), seems to be less important for the teacher. This is so because in everyday thinking he encounters only those cases of inference which follow very simple schemata of deduction, and then the wealth of other schemata, listed in formal logic, finds application but rarely. Hence it does not seem worthwhile to burden the teacher's memory with them." See (Ajdukiewicz, 1974: 3-4).

Moreover, he claimed that pragmatic methodology should always aim to understand clearly and fully what science is by discovering and describing why some scientists' attempts turn out to be successful (and valid) and why, in contrast, the community considers others as unsuccessful (and invalid). His article, which deals with the procedures of defining, is, in his own words, an example of an "insight-oriented" study.

It is worth noting here the opinion of Jerzy Giedymin on Ajdukiewicz's involvement and his comprehensive perspective: "But the important point is that throughout his whole life Ajdukiewicz took a keen interest in practical, moral and political issues [...] and spent a vast part of his time and enormous effort on teaching, reforming curricula [...], analyzing methods of teaching [...], organizing research and organizing regular symposia and conferences [...]. His activities in this area in post-war time created an exceptionally favourable atmosphere for logic-based philosophy. [...] His retirement did not alter his pattern of life. Until his death, he was popular and respected. In turn, he enjoyed his role and position. By contrast, he returned from his tour of the United States and Britain [...] rather depressed and disappointed by factional squabbles among philosophers and by the erosion of the sense, so strong in his own generation, of participating in a worthwhile, universal philosophical enterprise" (Giedymin 1974, 193).

Ajdukiewicz supervised many logic courses for students (tailored to the humanities, mathematics, natural sciences, *et cetera*) for different age groups and professions—even for officials and clerks. Ajdukiewicz strongly believed that the permanent development of an anti-irrationalist standpoint always strengthens a person's autonomy and independent thinking. We had the honour and pleasure to speak about Ajdukiewicz at many international congresses, gave lectures and talks to quite broad audiences. When we claimed that this is a unique program of social reform based on properly organized education in logic, we never heard about any similar project anywhere else in the world. Instead, what we heard was always a somewhat loud gasp when we spoke about the idea of a simple, sensible, practical, obligatory course in logic that would result in the anti-irrational, i.e., rational bureaucracy.

Therefore, like Freire, Ajdukiewicz believed that a clear and practical goal is a fundamental value and a necessary condition in the practical organization of education, work, and social life. Freire wrote: "It is to the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of that reality held by educators and people, that we must go find the program content of education. The investigation of what I have termed the people's 'thematic universe'—the complex

of their 'generative themes'—inaugurates the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom. The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness regarding these themes" (Freire 1996, 77-78).

2. Interpersonal Problem-Solving: Effective Social Dialogue

Both thinkers focused on problem-solving. Freire criticized the banking model of education, which is based on the metaphor of students as empty bank accounts that only receive information. It creates uniform individuals that are perfect elements, perfect cogs in the machine. Obviously, in consequence, no intellectual creativity is required; it is discouraged to the point of conducting to, in Freire's words, "castration." Banking education is based on imitation, repetition, and following the rules. It is highly irrational, as it does not even formulate goals; it just introduces algorithms and kills creativity and any critical reflection.

The educational style of Kazimierz Twardowski influenced Ajdukiewicz—the founder of the Lviv-Warsaw School and, in our view, the most successful philosophy educator and organizer in Europe (at least—we dare say). He encouraged all his disciples to follow their interests and always be experts both in their philosophical field and in the particular research domain that would become their speciality. Thus, for instance, if somebody wants to become a philosopher of language, they should also study philology; if they want to specialize in the philosophy of science, they should also major in mathematics, physics, *et cetera*. They should be focused on solving problems and always study how others have already approached the issue; however, their goal is to propose their unique solutions. Teamwork was based on critical thinking and cooperation. Precisely this imperative is what Freire emphasized when he suggested that his methodology "requires that the investigators and the people (who would normally be considered objects of that investigation) should act as *co-investigators*. The more active an attitude men and women take regarding the exploration of their thematics, the more they deepen their critical awareness of reality and, in spelling out those thematics, take possession of that reality" (Freire 1996, 87). He also highlighted this problem-solving attitude when he wrote: "The task of the dialogical teacher in an interdisciplinary team working on the thematic universe revealed by their investigation is to 'represent' that universe to the people from whom they have first received it—and 'represent' it not as a lecture, but as a problem. [...] And critical perception cannot be imposed. Thus, from

the very beginning, thematic investigation is expressed as an educational pursuit, as cultural action” (Freire 1996, 90-91, emphasis added). In this context, let us recall his foundational remark: “Authentic education is not carried on by “A” for “B” or by “A” about “B,” but rather by “A” with “B,” mediated by the world—a world that impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views and opinions about it” (Freire 1996, 74).

In order to briefly present Ajdukiewicz as an analytical philosopher who was focused on problem-solving and who at the same time was co-investigating these issues with his collaborators and colleagues, let us mention some of his philosophical achievements. Most importantly, he held that when we learn logic, we practice the art of logical thinking, but we also come to know certain connections between facts, which constitute the logical structure of the world. Ajdukiewicz elaborated his philosophical conception under the name of radical conventionalism. He improved upon Łukasiewicz’s classification of kinds of reasoning. He was a precursor of erotetic logic, and among other things, he made an expert analysis of interrogative sentences and introduced a helpful distinction between questions that require resolution and questions that require completion. He conducted an independent critique of specific primary formulations of reism (elaborated by his great friend and fellow philosopher—Tadeusz Kotarbiński). In a masterful polemic with Marxism, he showed that it is not true that every change implies a contradiction. Ajdukiewicz worked on the problem of definition from all angles. He made a fundamental contribution to categorial grammars, discovering a transparent way to index the syntactic categories of linguistic expressions.³ He showed the difference between correct speech and correct reasoning, indicating that correct reasoning is in accord with the connections that occur in reality and are not dependent on human decisions or customs. He emphasized that every infallible schema of inference is based upon a logical assertion that asserts a particular objective connection between states of affairs.

In the context of the problem-solving attitude, we should point out the distinction made by Freire between a challenge and a stimulus. A challenge would correspond to the problem-solving attitude as the basis of the pedagogy of liberation, while a stimulus is characteristic of the educational banking system. He explains that human beings should always treat problems as challenges, as limit-acts, questions that require answers, new creative solu-

³ The first structural grammar drawn up in a precise and complete way was Ajdukiewicz’s grammar presented in ‘Die syntaktische Konnexitaet’, *Studia Philosophica*, 1 (1936), pp. 1-27.

tions. Problems are historical, human, typical situations that enable growth and discovery or even pushing the limits. In contrast, a stimulus is ahistorical, connected with the animal world when the only possible attitude is to adapt, not question anything. Therefore it does not call for creative, critical thinking, or any awareness to overcome the limitations of reality. This distinction was perfectly described in many masterpieces. However, we would like to single out Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In his fictional dystopia, any revolt is ultimately impossible, critical thinking is considered a thought crime, and language in itself makes it impossible to perceive any problem as a challenge. Based on the punishment/reward dichotomy, any system treats every problem as a simple stimulus with a prescribed algorithmic response. In this context, we need to remember that Freire follows Veira Pinto in considering that "limit-situations" are not "the impossible boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin"; they are not "the frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being more" (Freire 1996, 80).

This approach is to a certain extent compatible with the distinction made by Gustave Thibon, which posits an essential difference between harmony and balance. Harmony is qualitative, based on divergent/convergent points of view, going into the direction/goal/ideal, following a similar hierarchy of values, and gladly accepting any contribution to solving a given problem. In contrast, balance is quantitative, measuring the same amount to unify and eradicate all distinctions. The results are the opposite. Harmony is alive, vibrant, and based on abundance, while balance leads to a total lack of creativity and stagnation to annihilate any differences. In a sense, it corresponds to what Freire calls biophilic and necrophilic approaches, respectively.

3. An erotetic pedagogy

Although considered from a very different perspective, the theory of questions is one of the main contributions to education made by both Ajdukiewicz and Freire. Following the principle from Rancière's quote mentioned above, we should judge people by their questions rather than by their answers.

Ajdukiewicz was one of the first to inspire the study on erotetic logic, i.e., the logic of questions. His paper on interrogative sentences from 1938 started an illustrious tradition in Poland, which later spread abroad.⁴ As we

⁴ Let us mention at least some developments of Ajdukiewicz's ideas within the theory of questions: Tadeusz Kubiński (systems of logic of questions), Jerzy Giedymin (presuppo-

mentioned above, in this groundbreaking paper, he introduced, among other things, a fundamental distinction between questions that require resolution and questions that require completion, the classification of questions and answers, and the definition of the positive and negative suppositions of a well-formulated question. In a similar vein to Józef M. Bocheński, who, at the end of his life, in the text “Advice of the old philosopher,” following G. E. Moore, wrote as the seventh piece of advice: “Before trying to find the answer to a question, ask yourself: what kind of question is this? Empirical, linguistic, logical, etc.,” so thanks to Ajdukiewicz we can answer this fundamental question about questions.

At the same time, questions are connected with the topic of authority. Again, Ajdukiewicz, like many renowned analytic philosophers, was a master in the art of questioning, even the most “sacred” authorities. Like, for example, Russell (in “A Liberal Decalogue”), the fifth commandment says: “Have no respect for the authority of others, for there are always contrary authorities to be found.” Similarly, the very last, the tenth advice, according to Bocheński also reminds us that: “[j]ust like in every science, authority is the weakest argument in philosophy. Hence, the following advice: be distrustful towards the assertions of others, in particular of popular philosophers; verify them for yourself before admitting them.”⁵ Of course, we can find already in Schopenhauer’s *Eristic Dialectic* that the argument from authority *argumentum ad verecundiam* is one of the weakest since it is, in fact, a logical fallacy. Nevertheless, if we think about the whole banking system of education, any system of oppression, and many irrational attitudes, are based on authority or even on an absolute, i.e., unquestionable, authority.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the title of one of the monumental works by Freire (the co-author is Antonio Faundez) *La pedagogía de la pregunta* (1985), was translated in 1992 as *Learning to Question: A Pedagogy of Liberation*. This book was written—understandably in a natural way—as a dialogue to show how to overcome the banking, mainstream education system, which involves teachers attempting to deposit information “into” students, i.e., passive, empty “accounts.” It emphasizes the role of knowing how to ask questions, and while this seems obvious and easy, history shows that it is one of the most difficult and, at the same time, essential skills. Freire and

sitions of questions), Leon Koj (the problem of justification of questions), Robert Leszko (the theory of numerical questions), Andrzej Wiśniewski (inferential erotetic logic, erotetic reducibilities, erotetic search scenarios), and Piotr Leśniewski (erotetic reducibilities).

⁵ Translation by A. Rostalska.

Faundez claimed that knowledge is usually reduced to knowing answers, whereas in reality, curiosity and awareness are based on knowing the fundamental questions, and most importantly, on knowing how to question. Freire said that mainstream education consists in giving ready-made answers without even formulating questions. It is to be noted that the title of a Spanish version of the book is: *Por una pedagogía de la pregunta. Crítica a una educación basada en respuestas a las preguntas inexistentes*, which can be translated as: *Towards a Pedagogy of the Question. A Critique of Education Based on Answers to the Non-Existent Questions*.

Moreover, Faudez and Freire agree that the very basis of democracy is questioning “é profundamente democrático começar a aprender a perguntar” (in English: “to start learning to ask questions is deeply democratic” Faudez, Freire 1998, 24). In this context, it is worth mentioning that a similar approach to education was developed among others by Ann Margaret Sharp and Matthew Lippmann; in the Latin American context by Ernesto Cardenal, in a Solentiname community; in Poland by the outstanding pedagogue Janusz Korczak, and by the author of “The Spirit of Solidarity”—Józef Tischner. Therefore, our attention should be drawn to the fact that people who worked with illiterate adults in Brazil or Mozambique; educators from the United States of America; a doctor who died with Jewish orphans in a German concentration camp; and the spiritual leader of Polish shipyard workers fighting against the communist regime all came to a very similar conclusion, especially about the role of dialogue—built on well-formulated questions concerning the present, existential and concrete situation.

4. Revolutionary Responsibility: The Pursuit of Social Reform through Education

All the authors mentioned above called for non-violent, i.e., dialogical, anti-irrational revolution through properly organized education, and they felt sincerely obliged to act within their communities. Their mission, very closely tied to their local, concrete conditions and a strong sense of responsibility, and maybe even surprisingly hopeful in such difficult situations, are in stark contrast with so many cynical attitudes. They were all quite shocked—or would have been shocked if they had had the chance to witness it—by the success, long-lasting legacy, and universality of their work. For instance, Tischner and Freire explicitly expressed their amazement at the fact that there were so many immediate translations of their works, and so many

surprising—i.e., unplanned—applications of them, primarily as they were written in the heat of the moment, for particular audiences, describing very particular—if not unique—historical, economic, or social contexts.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that, for instance, Ajdukiewicz, on the one hand, underestimated his achievement and felt quite depressed by what he saw in the best universities in Great Britain and the United States at the time. He spent the final stage of his life mainly in Warsaw. Paradoxically, this was the period of the most significant recognition of his work, full of invitations from the best universities in Europe and the United States; however, it turns out that it was also a time of deep disappointment. Even in retirement, he continued to work very hard, actively participating in Poland's intellectual life and joining international scientific organizations. Jerzy Giedymin recalled that Ajdukiewicz was devastated when he returned from the United States and Great Britain. "By contrast, he returned from his tour of the United States and Britain (in the late 'fifties, I think) rather depressed and disappointed by factional squabbles among philosophers and by the erosion of the sense, so strong in his own generation, of participating in a worthwhile, universal philosophical enterprise" (Giedymin 1974, 194).

Freire held, like Tischner, that every authentic, genuine dialogue is already a revolutionary event. Moreover, "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" specifically addresses radical thinkers, whom he contrasts with sectarians. In the Preface, he wrote: "This volume will probably arouse negative reactions in a number of readers. Some will regard my position vis-à-vis the problem of human liberation as purely idealistic, or may even consider discussion of ontological vocation, love, dialogue, hope, humility, and sympathy as so much reactionary 'blah.' Others will not (or will not wish to) accept my denunciation of a state of oppression that gratifies the oppressors. Accordingly, this admittedly tentative work is for radicals. I am certain that Christians and Marxists. But the reader who dogmatically assumes closed, 'irrational' positions will reject the dialogue I hope this book will open." (Freire 1996, 19, emphasis added). Freire sees sectarians—present across the political spectrum—as people who suffer from a lack of doubt, people closed in the circle of certainty, who cannot enter into dialogue or carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed. As such, they end up "treating history in [...] a proprietary fashion, [they] end up without people—which is another way of being against them." (Freire 1996, 21). He also pointed out that the essence of dialogue, as a human phenomenon, is *the word*, understood as two-dimensional, i.e., containing reflection and action, at the same time, "in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers.

There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world" (Freire 1996: 68). It must be noted that, according to Freire, the sacrifice of action results in verbalism, whereas the effect of sacrificing reflection is activism. Therefore he posits the following equation *word = work = praxis*. A similar analogy between speech and work can be found in Tischner's "The Spirit of Solidarity," where he considers work as a particular type of dialogue.

On the relation between theory and practice, Garza Camino wrote that Freire's: "pedagogy at its best is neither training, teaching method, nor political indoctrination. [... it] is not a method or an a priori technique to be imposed on all students but a *political and moral practice* that provides the knowledge, skills, and social relations that enable students to explore the possibilities of what it means to be critical citizens while expanding and deepening their participation in the promise of a substantive democracy" (Garza Camino 2021, 3).

5. Conditions of Dialogue

5.1. Dignity

According to Freire, the most pervasive model of human relations is the opposition oppressor-oppressed. This opposition results in two dehumanized visions of the human being. Moreover, this opposition is often long-lasting, as even in revolutions (we mean any revolution that is non-dialogical, i.e., entails violence), change is limited to merely switching places. Freire, however, calls for the most radical revolution: a dialogical revolution that would permanently overcome the opposition mentioned above, in other words, one that would create entirely new models of social relations, where there would be no place for either oppressors or victims. It is about recovery and reconciliation, which would save the dignity of both sides of the conflict. As we already know, Freire believed that such revolution could only be realized through dialogue—thus in a similar vein to Tischner, Reyes Mate, and many others.

Irrationality and confusion destroy one's sense of dignity since, according to Paul Valéry, there are only two relations between people: logic and war. In "Monsieur Teste", he described the rational, logical attitude as politeness, the courtesy we owe to one another. Just as Simone Weil pointed out in her brilliant analyses of oppression, based on personal experience, even the most arduous working conditions do not make the most painful reality of

oppression since this would also involve disrespect and humiliation. Tischner also talked about the senselessness of work, which, alongside physical and spiritual suffering, should be eliminated through dialogue since the unnecessary suffering added to the inevitable burden of life is, in his opinion, the main subject of dialogue.

In his glorious presentation of Juan Rulfo's photography, Carlos Fuentes formulated a very intriguing definition of dignity when he wrote that it is "una riqueza inmediatamente reconocible"—"the immediately recognizable richness." He indicated a fundamental (and brilliant) connection between dignity and the abundance of possibilities. This connection suggests that to respect anybody, we must first be able to see the person and see the abundance of their potential. Consequently, disrespect (and humiliation) starts from ignoring or refusing to recognize another person's possibilities to change and grow, their skills, capabilities, the possibility of them having a better future, *et cetera*. Since the 1980s, this point of view has been one of the basic assumptions of the capabilities approach (A. Sen, M. Nussbaum, and others).

5.2. Developing Individual Talents Based on Shared Skills

According to Freire, a genuine dialogue lifts the dichotomies between people and the dichotomies between people and the world. In addition, it preserves and celebrates the differences amongst them, and there is absolutely no need for unification. It is about abundance, biophilia, the plurality of styles and is against the "culture of silence" and invisibilization. Dialogue is about making everyone visible and enabling them to see every perspective, specific context, and nuance, thanks to the analogical approach, in contrast to the univocal approach characteristic of monologue.

Both Ajdukiewicz and Freire supported the development of students' talents. However, they also believed in the fundamental importance of some basic skills and a particular intellectual attitude that enables rational dialogue, i.e., dialogue that allows the realization of common objectives and values. Hence, the great majority of their publications consist of unique/original textbooks that help the communication process through the development of abilities, especially analytical tools, for instance: asking questions, defining and classifying notions, evaluating arguments, recognizing limitations, correcting errors, being aware of prejudices and hidden supposition, *et cetera*.

The emphasis placed on pragmatic aspects in the conceptions of Ajdukiewicz and Freire calls for flexibility and open-mindedness. In order to understand one's concrete situation, one has to be able to recognize the uniqueness of the other person's situation. Everybody is unique. However, Ajdukiewicz and Freire both believed that our similarities are more important than the differences. Dialogue, thinking in terms of relations, is always beneficial for both participants. Nevertheless, following dialogical thinkers like Tischner, Mate, Freire, and Dussel, if the essential topic of dialogue should be unnecessary suffering, exploitation, and oppression, the victims' perspective always provides us with the bigger picture.

5.3. A Language of Dialogue: Clarity in Communication

When it comes to the language of dialogue, the essential characteristic is clarity. However, clarity cannot be achieved once and for all, it is a work in progress, and our language will always require updates and should be amenable to clarification. In this context, it is significant that Ajdukiewicz's colleagues and collaborators called him a "profundist," i.e., a mind that burrows into the heart of things, as he had one way to deal with widespread delusion in various domains of philosophy, in the broad sense. He calmly took various proposed ideas into his workshop and went straight to their core, with a critical mind.

As Kotarbiński wrote, Ajdukiewicz was the most discerning connoisseur and judge of the ideas proposed in his time. As we mentioned above, he was not afraid of the authorities, and his activity at the Lviv-Warsaw School typified this attitude. One who reads Ajdukiewicz's scientific works will see his tremendous responsibility, as a scholar, for the spoken and written word and his most profound conviction that human thought is mature only when it finds precise and communicative expression in words. He wrote: "[...] pupils should be trained to make statements that are matter-of-fact, unambiguous, and precise." Ajdukiewicz believed that the ability to formulate "[...] one's statements is indispensable not only in school but also in everyday life. Nonobservance of these three requirements may be tolerated in those cases where speech serves to express emotions or to arouse them, e.g., in poetry and unscrupulous agitation, but never in those cases where cognition and/or rational (i.e., a cognition-based) action are at stake. Hence it is evident that developing in pupils the ability and the urge to make statements which are matter-of-fact, unambiguous and precise is one of the principal tasks of school education" (Ajdukiewicz 1974, 3).

The main idea of semantic epistemology—Ajdukiewicz’s flagship project—consists of applying formal methods to solve philosophical problems. As the title of the definitive collection of his works implies, “Language and Cognition” were the centre of his philosophical interests.

Tischner shared the same idea as a condition *sine qua non*, and of course Freire; however, the dangers of confusion and contradictions in language were also masterfully described in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Some of the linguistics strategies that make any revolt or critical thought impossible are compatible with Freire’s description of “the culture of silence,” where victims cannot see and hear themselves and, hence, are unaware of the worst oppression. In “Children of the Days,” Eduardo Galeano provides us with a beautiful description of the opposite process, namely that of “conscientização” when on September 8th, a man tells Freire that he could not sleep all night after he had written his name for the first time in his life.

Conclusions

It seems that dialogical and analytical thinkers, especially from the Lviv-Warsaw School, had surprisingly convergent ideas regarding education. There are two basic systems of education: liberating, dialogical, horizontal, anti-irrational, and radical, and on the other, dominating, monologic, vertical, irrational, and sectarian. Of course, according to Freire, all these opposing characteristics fall under the most general and decisive opposition between biophilia and necrophilia. Following Ajdukiewicz, pragmatically organized education in logic is required in any dialogical approach to education and social life. In consequence, only within dialogical education can we consider styles, as it is the only option that accepts and promotes creativity.

It can be assumed that all current projects and implementations of—more or less—revolutionary transformations of social structures should also result in changes within educational systems. In the context of the experiences of the previous century, in particular, the Polish social movement related to the activities and heritage of the NSZZ “Solidarność” [The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”]—its successes and failures—it should be assumed, however, that only (revolutionary) changes in educational systems will result in positive and effective projects (and implementations) of transformation of social structures. Suppose we are interested in the future formation of (diverse) institutions of a dialogical society. In that case, it must be assumed that these processes of constituting such institutions should be firmly and deeply founded on accurately (pragmatically)

organized education within the framework of logic. At this point, let us support this conviction with the hope expressed by Rancière in the following passage:

It is always possible to play with this relation of self to self, to bring it back to its primary veracity and waken the reasonable man in social man (Rancière 1991, 108).

Finally, let us note that that this year, on September 19th, we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of Paulo Freire's birth. Another mention of Freire in "The Children of the Days" can be found on November 28th. Galeano recalls that on this day in 2009, 12 years after Freire's death, the Brazilian government apologized for arresting and throwing him out of the country without permission to return, and adds this crucial piece of information: "Today, 340 Brazilian schools bear his name."

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